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1 Introduction
A functionally correct system must satisfy a range of sys-
temic (i.e. non-functional) requirements to be fit for pur-
pose. Systemic requirements include energy efficiency, low
noise emission, low EMF radiation, (real)-timeliness, se-
curity, cost effectiveness etc. The main difficulty is that
while functional correctness can often be modularised,
systemic ‘correctness’ cannot be modularised. The reason
is that systemic properties are not compositional, i.e. the
systemic properties of individual components are rarely
preserved when the components are integrated because
the components tend to interfere with each other in many
unexpected ways. Engineers usually over-dimension de-
signs to cater for the worst case scenario, which makes
systems more costly than strictly necessary.
We offer insight into the interaction of two systemic
properties: security and real-timeliness, where we use the
timing attack [12] as the prime example of an undesir-
able interaction. Mounting a timing attack requires the
ability to measure time with predictable accuracy, which
is of course exactly what real-time systems are all about.
Therefore we claim that the security of a system can be
weakened in principle by making the system suitable for
real-time applications. It is precisely this kind of interac-
tion that is horribly difficult to predict, and which ulti-
mately determines whether a system is fit for purpose.
2 Timing attacks
Timing attacks can be used to discover a secret key by
measuring the time taken by cryptographic operations.
Other systemic properties can be exploited in the same
way, for instance to mount power attacks [7], and attacks
based on fault induction [5] etc.
The basic assumptions of timing analysis are:
1. The run time of a cryptographic operation depends
to some extent on the key. With present hardware
this is likely to be the case, but note that there are
various efficient hardware based proposals to make
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the timing attack less feasible through ‘noise injec-
tion’ [17]. Software approaches to make the timing
attack infeasible are based on the idea that the com-
putations in two branches of a conditional should
take the same amount of time (‘branch equalisation’).
This is costly [2].
2. A sufficiently large number of encryptions can be car-
ried out, during which time the key does not change.
A challenge response protocol is ideal for Timing At-
tacks.
3. Time can be measured with known error. The smaller
the error, the fewer time measurements are required.
Different versions of timing attack have been reported
to be effective with RSAREF [15], DES [14], and RC5 [13].
Timing attacks usually take place in a controlled envi-
ronment, where the system under attack (often a smart
card) is connected to measurement equipment, particu-
larly to control the errors in the timing measurements. A
recent report [6] describes a timing attack on OpenSSL.
However, the report acknowledges that mounting this at-
tack over the network is unlikely to be successful because
time measurement is too inaccurate. We believe that in
a distributed system with real-time properties, timing at-
tacks on the security protocols of such system may become
a threat. This is the focus of our paper.
3 Modelling
To predict the kinds of attacks that could be mounted on
the security of a distributed system would appear to be
difficult in its full generality. However, by singling out
specific systemic properties we believe that progress can
be made by modelling the cause and effects of the attacks.
We adhere to the usual Dolev-Yao model of attackers [11],
where we take into account timing information. This re-
quires that we model both the protocol and the encryption
scheme.
Timing aspects of encryption schemes are typically
analysed using statistical methods and tools such as Mat-
lab, where attacks are modelled as signal detection prob-
lems. The signal is in some way correlated with the se-
cret keys. The noise originates from timing inaccuracy,
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unknown key bits etc [15]. The level of abstraction is
generally too low to take protocol aspects into account.
Security protocols are typically analysed using formal
methods and tools such as Casper [16], and CoProVe [9],
where attacks are modelled by an attacker who learns se-
crets by inspecting, deleting and repeating messages. The
level of abstraction is generally too high to take timing in-
formation into account.
We have not been able to find related work that ad-
dresses the combined modelling of secrecy and timing.
As an initial step towards combined modelling we study
a simple protocol using the timed automata based mod-
elling method and tool Uppaal [4]. To offer insight into
the problems that will arise, we describe:
• an abstraction of the timing attack in the ‘security
protocol verification’ style (Section 4), followed by
• an analysis of the attack in the ‘timed automata ver-
ification’ style (Section 5).
4 Abstraction
In the design of cryptographic protocols, it is usually a
good idea to adopt an abstract view of cryptographic op-
erations. For example, given a message M representing a
bit string, encryption can be represented by a symbolic op-
eration denoted {M}K , whereK is a message representing
the cryptographic key. The operator {·}· can be seen as
a “black-box” operation, that hides all the details of the
particular encryption algorithm. Typically, the only way
to obtainM again from {M}K is by possessing the correct
key K. To illustrate this point consider Figure 1. Cryp-
tographic protocols use an encryption scheme to achieve
some security goals. Analysing the protocol in an idealised
setting, while assuming “black-box” cryptography, we can
avoid considering the dashed box and arrow of Figure 1.
This means that we can ignore any vulnerability of the
encryption scheme and concentrate on the vulnerabilities
of the protocol. However, in many cases it is unrealis-
tic to ignore the vulnerabilities of the encryption scheme,
thus we should be turning the “black-box” approach into
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Figure 1: Protocols achieve goals by using cryptography.
Ideal black-box cryptography avoids cryptographic vul-
nerabilities, i.e. ignore the dashed box and arrow.
We focus on the case where the encryption scheme is
vulnerable to timing attacks. In other words, we are in-
terested in studying the security of protocols which are
implemented using an encryption scheme that is subject
to timing attacks. Consider, as an example, the following
protocol:
1. A → B : {{V }K , action}KB
2. B → A :
{
{V }KA if action = “decrypt”
{ok}KA if action = “store”
First, A prepares a message consisting of a value
{V }K together with a value action chosen from
{“decrypt”, “store”}. Then, A encrypts this message with
B’s public key KB and sends it to B in message 1. When
B receives this message, it extracts and inspects action.
If the action is “decrypt”, B decrypts {V }K (we assume
that B knows K) and obtains V . Then, B encrypts V
with A’s public key and sends it to A. If the action is
“store”, B simply stores {V }K and replies to A the value
“ok” encrypted with A’s public key.
Suppose that, for privacy’s sake, we would like to keep
the value of action secret. If we assume that encryption is
non-deterministic, an attacker would not be able to dis-
tinguish between B’s response, that is between {V }KA
and {ok}KA . Thus, in an idealised setting the secrecy of
action would be preserved.
Now suppose that encryption is subject to timing at-
tacks. More precisely, we suppose that an attacker can
measure the time, say t, between receiving message 1 by
B and sending message 2, also by B. Thus, an attacker
would notice that on average, t is larger when action is
“decrypt” than when action is “store”. This is so since
when action is “decrypt”, B needs to perform an extra
decryption of {V }K , which is not carried out when action
is “store”. Therefore, the ability of the attacker to mea-
sure the time allows the attacker to mount a successful
attack and obtain the value of action, intended to be se-
cret. With the present tools and methodologies for se-
curity protocol verification we cannot model this attack
because the notion of time is absent. Therefore we explore
the possibilities of using Uppaal, which does offer timing
analysis capabilities.
5 Analysis
We modelled the system with timed automata [3] using
the tool Uppaal. Timed automata extend finite state au-
tomata by the usage of clocks that can be reset and used
in invariants on locations and guards on transitions.
The system consists of three processes, the Sender, the
Receiver and an Attacker, each of them modelled as a
timed automaton (see figures 2, 3, and 4).
The sender can wait an arbitrary amount of time, and














































Figure 4: Timed automaton for an Attacker
tinues by synchronisation via the channel send message
with the receiver, which models the sending of a message.
The receiver then starts to decode the message. De-
coding models the combined effect of the public key de-
cryption and the choice of the conditional. After hav-
ing finished decoding, the receiver decides which type of
message it has received. Because we abstract from data-
transmission in this model, the decision is nondeterminis-
tic. Depending on the decision, the local variable longmes-
sage is assigned 1 and a decryption has to take place
(corresponding to action = “decrypt”), before the loca-
tion Send is reached. In the other case the local variable
longmessage is assigned 0 and there is a direct transition
to the location Send (corresponding to action = “store”).
This location is left immediately synchronising on the ur-
gent channel receive answer, thus modelling that an an-
swer is sent.
The attacker is able to synchronise on the actions
send message and receive answer, modelled using broad-
cast channels. The attacker counts time units (variable
diff) between a send message and a receive answer. The
attacker also counts time units between a new pair of
send message and a receive answer (variable diff1). The
attacker then compares the two durations diff and diff1.
If no difference is detected, the attacker goes back to ob-
serve a new message exchange. If the attacker detects
a significant difference, the smaller is identified as de-
tect short message and the longer as detect long message.
By model checking we have verified that if the attacker
identifies the last message as a long message, the local de-
cision of the receiver is indeed longmessage=1, and simi-
larly for short messages.
When changing the receiver automaton, such that it can
wait an arbitrary time before sending the answer (See Fig-
ure 5), the type of message cannot be identified any more
correctly. Model checking this changed system shows that
we can reach a state where longmessage=1, and the At-
tacker is in state detect short message.
The Uppaal model illustrates that a timing attack can
be modelled under ideal circumstances, where the proba-
bility of making the correct inference is either 0 or 1. An
obvious extension would be to consider non-trivial prob-
abilities, thus approaching a more realistic version of the
Timing Attack. This is supported by e.g. the MoDeST
approach, which is an extension of timed automata with
stochastic concepts [10].
6 Conclusions and Future work
The notional separation of security protocols from en-
cryption schemes has made it possible to make significant
progress in security modelling and analysis in each sepa-
rate domain. However, timing affects the protocols and















Figure 5: Timed automaton for a Receiver with an extra
delay before sending
protocols and encryption schemes will have to be studied
simultaneously. The development of the theory under-
pinning this has already been initiated [1], but work on
modelling methods and tools is yet to start. We believe
this work to be essential for the development of sound
engineering methods for security in distributed systems.
We have studied a simplified version of the timing at-
tack; we intend to take the statistics of the attack into
account in future work.
One possible avenue of research is to use existing tools
for the verification of both encryption schemes and secu-
rity protocols. This would have the advantage that we
can leverage the power of the tools, which, at the cost
of many person years, have been engineered to be able
to cope with sizeable models. It may also be possible to
make a connection between different tools (for example
Uppaal, MoDeST and CoProVe) so that results from one
tool can be fed into the other and vice versa.
Another, equally important avenue of research is to de-
velop modelling methods for protocols that are a little less
abstract, and modelling methods for security schemes that
are a little more abstract. Each represents a bridgehead,
which, we hope, will eventually support a strong bridge
between the two domains.
Countermeasures for timing attacks must be modelled
so that we can study how effective the proposed mea-
sures are. The two measures that are currently in use
(i.e. noise injection and branch equalisation) appear to
be fundamentally different in the sense that noise injec-
tion weakens the power of the timing attack but it does
not defeat it, whereas branch equalisation does defeat the
attack but at significant cost.
Finally, the problems that we have discussed relating
to timing will appear also in relation to the other sys-
temic parameters, thus requiring the study of interac-
tion between a multitude of systemic parameters. One
might hope that eventually a general theory and associ-
ated methods and tools might emerge that will support
the security engineer.
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